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Labor Law
LABOR

LAW-UNAUTHORIZED

STRIKES-INTERNATIONAL

UNION HAS

DUTY UNDER IMPLIED NO-STRIKE OBLIGATION TO USE ALL REASONABLE MEANS TO END
UNAUTHORIZED STRIKE
BY ROVING
PICKETS WHICH RESULTS IN SYMPATHY STRIKE.

Republic Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America (1978)
Republic Steel Corporation (Republic) owned and operated two coal
mines in western Pennsylvania. 1 Its employees were represented for collective bargaining purposes by the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA)
and its respective district, subdistrict and local unions. 2 Both Republic and
the UMWA were parties to the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement
of 1974 (Agreement), 3 which provided procedures for grievance settlement
and arbitration.

4

In August 1975 and January 1976, union employees at Republic's mines
refused to cross picket lines erected there by stranger UMWA pickets. 5
The stranger pickets in the latter strike 6 had been engaged in a dispute with
their employer, the Buckeye Coal Co. (Buckeye), 7 also a party to the
1. Republic Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, 570 F.2d 467, 469 (3d Cir.
1978).
2. Id. at 467.
3. Id. at 474.
4. See National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1974. Article XXIII(c) of the 1974
Agreement, which comprises the "Settlement of Disputes" section, establishes specific grievance procedures and provides that
[s]hould differences arise between the Mine Workers and the Employer as to meaning
and application of the provisions of this Agreement, or should differences arise about
matters not specifically mentioned in this Agreement, or should any local trouble of any
kind arise at the mine, an earnest effort shall be made to settle such differences at the
earliest practicable time.
570 F.2d at 474 n.14. Article XXVII, entitled "Maintain Integrity of Contract and Resort to
Courts," provides that
all disputes and claims which are not settled by agreement shall be settled by the
machinery provided in the "Settlement of Disputes" Article of this Agreement unless
national in character in which event the parties shall settle such disputes by free collective bargaining as heretofore practiced in the industry, it being the purpose of this provision to provide for the settlement of all such disputes and claims through the machinery
in this contract and by collective bargaining without recourse to the courts.
Id.
5. 570 F.2d at 469. "Stranger picketing" is picketing by nonemployees of the picketed
establishment. See American Fed'n of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 324 (1940).
6. There is no evidence in the record as to the origins of the stranger pickets in the August
1975 strike.
7. 570 F.2d at 469. Originally, the stranger pickets in the January 1976 strike were identified in Republic's complaint as John Doe and Richard Roe. Id. They were later conceded by
the UMWA to be union members and Buckeye employees. Id.
The record did not disclose the nature of the dispute between the stranger pickets and
their employer in the case of either strike. The court was thus unable to determine whether
these disputes were subject to the compulsory grievance-arbitration procedures under a collective bargaining agreement. Id. Nor did the record disclose what, if any, action the unions took

(369)
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Agreement. 8 Republic filed two separate actions before two different district
court judges, 9 seeking injunctive relief and money damages 10 pursuant to
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act,1 1 naming
as defendants the UMWA, the district and local unions, union offlicers, and
12
the stranger pickets.
In the first suit, summary judgment was entered in favor of all defendants 13 on the damages issue, 1 4 but the UMWA's motion for summary
judgment on that issue was denied in the second suit.15 In a consolidated
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 16 upheld
the latter ruling, holding that the UMWA union could be held liable for
damages sustained by a mine operator as a result of a sympathy strike staged
by union employees in support of stranger pickets, upon a determination
that the conduct of the stranger pickets was in breach of the industry-wide

either to terminate the strikes in which the stranger pickets were engaged or to prevent the
spread of those strikes to Republic's mines. Id.
8. Id. at 479. See note 4 supra.
9. 570 F.2d at 469. After the August 1975 strike, Civil Action No. 75-1083 was brought
before Judge Teitelbaum in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania. After the January 1976 strike, Civil Action No. 76-92 was instituted before Chief
Judge Weber in the same district. The latter case is reported at 428 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Pa.),
motion fo'r reconsideration denied, 444 F. Supp. 264 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
10. Republic based its claims for compensatory damages on the loss of business it sustained
during the strikes. 570 F.2d at 469. Specifically, Republic argued that the district and local
unions and their officers were liable for damages arising out of a strike in breach of a contractual
obligation to arbitrate all disputes. 444 F. Supp. at 265. Republic also argued that the UMWA
was liable for failing to halt the spread of the Buckeye strike. Id. Republic's allegations as to
district and local union liability under this latter theory were considered insufficient by the
court. 570 F.2d at 478.
11. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between
any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without
regard to the citizenship of the parties.
(b) . . . Any labor organization . . . may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of
the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment against a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be
enforceable against any individual member or his assets.
Id.
12. 570 F.2d at 469. The stranger pickets were named defendants in Civil Action No. 76-92
only. See note 9 supra.
13. 570 F.2d at 469.
14. In both suits, preliminary injunctions were issued against the strikes. This was prior to
the decision of the Supreme Court in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 428
U.S. 397 (1976), in which the Court held that a sympathy strike could not be enjoined pending
arbitration as to whether such a strike was forbidden by a contractual no-strike provision. Id. at
410-11. See 428 F. Supp. at 639. See also notes 39-41 and accompanying text infra.
Without determining the validity of Republic's claim for injunctive relief, the Third Circuit
noted that that aspect of the case was moot. 570 F.2d at 469 n.1.
15. 570 F.2d at 469. Summary judgments were entered as to all defendants, Id.
16. The case was heard by Judges Aldisert and Weis, and Judge Christensen of the United
States District Court for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. Judge Aldisert wrote the
opinion.
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collective bargaining agreement and that the UMWA failed to exercise all
reasonable means to halt that unlawful conduct. Republic Steel Corp. v.
United Mine Workers of America, 570 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1978).
Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act1 7 empowers the federal courts to
enforce the arbitration and no-strike provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement.18 Where a collective bargaining agreement contains a compulsory
arbitration provision but does not contain a no-strike provision, a court may
imply a no-strike obligation. 19 The UMWA in Republic Steel was subject to
such an implied obligation. 20 Where an implied no-strike obligation is
deemed to exist, a union obliged thereunder may generally be held liable for
monetary damages arising from a strike over a labor-management dispute
17. See note 11 supra. Before the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, varying state laws
of contract and procedure had made it extremely difficult for parties to secure judicial enforcement of promises made in collective bargaining agreements. Congress enacted § 301 of the Act
to eliminate these obstacles in the interest of promoting industrial peace. See R. GORMAN,
BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 545 (1976).
18. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The agreement in Lincoln
Mills contained both arbitration and no-strike provisions. Id. at 449. When the employer refused to submit several appropriate grievances to arbitration, the union sued under the TaftHartley Act. Id. The Supreme Court in Lincoln Mills held that the employer's promise to
arbitrate could be specifically enforced under § 301(a) of the Act. Id. at 457-58. The Court
stated:
Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike. Viewed in this light, the [Taft-Hartley] legislation does more than
confer jurisdiction in the federal courts over labor organizations. It expresses a federal
policy that federal courts should enforce these agreements on behalf of or against labor
organizations and that industrial peace can be best obtained only in that way.
Id. at 455.
Following this quid pro quo rationale, the Supreme Court has held that where a collective
bargaining agreement contains both a no-strike clause and a provision for binding arbitration, a
federal court is empowered to issue an injunction against a strike by the union over an arbitrable dispute, pending arbitration of that dispute. Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398
U.S. 235 (1970), noted in 16 VILL. L. REV. 176 (1970). The Boys Markets decision represented
a "narrow exception," justified by national labor policy, to the general ban on federal strike
injunctions contained in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976). 398 U.S. at
253-55.
19. Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). The
employer in Lucas Flour initiated an action for damages arising from a union strike, alleging
breach of the labor contract which contained an arbitration clause but did not contain a no-strike
clause. Id. at 97. The Supreme Court extended the quid pro quo reasoning of Lincoln Mills and
allowed the recovery of damages, holding that the presence of the arbitration provision gave rise
to an implied obligation on the part of the union not to strike over any dispute which was
subject to arbitration. Id. at 105-06.
An implied no-strike obligation may also be the basis for a Boys Markets injunction. See
Gateway Coal Co. v. UMWA, 414 U.S. 368, 381-82 (1974). According to the Gateway Coal
Court, however, any implied no-strike obligation may be contractually restricted:
It would be unusual, but certainly permissible, for the parties to agree to a broad mandatory arbitration provision yet expressly negate any implied no-strike obligation. Such a
contract would reinstate the situation commonly existing before our decision in Boys
Markets. Absent an explicit expression of such an intention, however, the agreement to
arbitrate and the duty not to strike should be construed as having coterminous application.
Id. at 382.
20. 570 F.2d at 474. In Gateway Coal Co. v. UMWA, 414 U.S. 368 (1974), the Supreme
Court interpreted the 1968 National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement as containing an "implied undertaking not to strike." Id. at 385 n.15. The Third Circuit similarly interpreted the
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when the union authorizes the strike despite a duty to arbitrate. 2 ' This
rule, however, is not generally applicable to situations where a wildcat strike
22
or a sympathy strike has occurred.
The problem typically arising with an unauthorized or wildcat strike is
that the union simply denies its responsibility for the unauthorized activitiy
of its members. 23 For quite some time, federal courts have attempted to
resolve the issue of union liability for such strikes. 2 4 The Fourth Circuit, in
United Construction Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 2 5 ruled that a union
could not be held liable for an unauthorized strike without proof that the
26
union adopted, encouraged, or prolonged the continuance of the strike.
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits, 2 7 however, have followed the alternative approach of United States v. UMWA, 2 8 which held a union responsible for the
mass action of its members despite the union's contention that the mass
strike was unauthorized.2 9 The Third Circuit adopted a novel approach in
1971 Agreement in Island Creek Coal Co. v. UMWA, 507 F.2d 650 (3d Cir.,) cert. denied, 423
U.S. 877 (1975). In United States Steel Corp. v. UMWA (U.S. Steel 1), 534 F.2d 1063 (3d Cir.
1976), the Third Circuit held that the 1974 Agreement, which was applicable in Republic Steel,
made "no change of substance in the rights and obligations of the covenanting parties" as established under the 1971 Agreement. Id. at 1071.
21. Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). See note 19
supra.
22. See notes 23-44 and accompanying text infra.
A wildcat strike is a work stoppage by a group of union members without union authorization or approval, which may or may not be in violation of an applicable collective bargaining
agreement. Gould, The Status of Unauthorized and "Wildcat" Strikes Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 672, 673 n.6 (1967). This appears to be the better definition in
view of leading case law. id. See, e.g., United Constr. Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d
872, 877-78 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 847 (1955); NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199,
205 (4th Cir. 1944); Eazor Express, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 357 F. Supp. 158, 161 n.4
(W.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 935 (1976). See also
R. GORMAN, supra note 17, at 307; Atelson, Work Group Behavior and Wildcat Strikes, 34
OHIO ST. L.J. 751, 754-56 (1973).
Other authorities have urged a broader definition which would include as a "wildcat strike"
a union authorized strike in breach of contract. See Fishman & Brown, Union Responsibility for
Wildcat Strikes, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 1017 (1975); Magnum, Taming Wildcat Strikes, 38 HARv.
Bus. REV. 88, 88 & n.2 (1960).
For purposes of this casenote, the former definition will apply.
23. See Fishman & Brown, supra note 22, at 1017-18.
24. See generally Gould, supra note 22; see also Fishman & Brown, supra note 22.
25. 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 847 (1955). Haislip involved a compulsory arbitration provision from which the court implied a no-strike obligation which was binding
on the union. 223 F.2d at 877.
26. 223 F.2d at 877. In determining union liability for wildcat strikes, the court observed:
"The question is not whether ... [defendant national unions] did everything they might have
done, but whether they adopted, encouraged, or prolonged the continuance of the strike." Id.
at 877-78.
27. See, e.g., Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Local 1104, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio, and Mach.
Workers, 496 F.2d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 1974); Vulcan Materials Co. v. United Steelworkers of
America, 430 F.2d 446, 455 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 963 (1971).
28. 77 F. Supp. 563 (D.D.C. 1948), aff'd on other grounds, 177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 871 (1949).
29. 77 F. Supp. at 566. The court stated the following principle:
[Als long as a union is functioning as a union it must be held responsible for the mass
action of its members. It is perfectly obvious not only in objective reasoning but because
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Eazor Express, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters.30 The
Eazor Express court held that an obligation on the part of a union to use
every reasonable means to bring an end to an unauthorized strike staged by
its members was necessarily implied from the presence of an express nostrike provision. 3 ' Where a union failed to use such efforts, it could be held
liable for damages arising from the strike. 3 2 In United States Steel Corp. v.
UMWA (U.S. Steel I),33 the Third Circuit, while not expressly deciding the
issue, 3 4 indicated that an identical duty would arise in the case of an implied
35
no-strike obligation.
The occurrence of a sympathy strike presents an additional complication
because the propriety of the strike itself is typically the only disputed issue
between the employer and the striking employees. 3 6 The circuit courts were
sharply divided 3 7 as to whether it was proper to issue an injunction against a

of experience that men don't act collectively without leadership. The idea of suggesting
that from 350,000 to 450,000 men would all get the same idea at once, independently of
leadership, and walk out of the mines, is of course simply ridiculous.
Id.
30. 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 935 (1976). Eazor Express involved
two trucking companies, Daniels Motor Freight and its parent company, Eazor Express. 520
F.2d at 955. A wildcat strike over the discharge of two employees occurred at the Daniels
terminal and spread to the Eazor terminal. Id. at 956. The union locals and the Teamsters
International repeatedly characterized the strikes as unauthorized and illegal, and urged their
members to return to work, but took no other action. Id. Eazor and Daniels filed suit against
the International and both locals for damages arising from the strike. Id. at 954-55.
For a discussion of Eazor Express, see Note, 19 VILL. L. REV. 665 (1974).
31. 520 F.2d at 955-63. The collective bargaining agreements in force in Eazor Express
consisted of the main national agreement and two supplemental regional agreements. Id. at 955.
The Daniels and Eazor supplemental agreements both contained an express no-strike provision.
Id. The Eazor Express court held that these no-strike provisions were binding upon the International. Id. at 959.
The Daniels supplemental agreement expressly recognized an obligation on the part of the
union to exercise all reasonable means to halt an unauthorized strike. Id. at 961-62. The Eazor
Express court reasoned that since the Daniels agreement recognized rather than created this
duty, the obligation must have stemmed from the no-strike clause, and thus existed in the
Eazor agreement as well. Id. at 962-63. The Teamsters were thus held to have been under an
"all reasonable means" obligation to end the strikes at both the Eazor and Daniels terminals. Id.
at 963. For a criticism of this reasoning by the court, see Note, 89 HARV. L. REV. 601, 609-10
(1976).
According to the Eazor Express court, "mere rhetoric" is not sufficient to fulfill the "all
reasonable means" obligation. 520 F.2d at 964. Rather, "stronger measures" are required, such
as the disciplining of strike organizers, the suspension or fining of striking union members, and
the placing of local unions in temporary trusteeship. Id.
32. 520 F.2d at 966-74.
33. 534 F.2d 1063 (3d Cir. 1976).
34. See note 81 infra.
35. 534 F.2d at 1073. See notes 81-83 and accompanying text infra.
36. For example, the Republic employees in Republic Steel went on strike in support of the
Buckeye pickets, not because of any prior dispute with Republic. 570 F.2d at 469. It was
Republic's contention that this sympathy strike was illegal. Id. Thus the strike itself became the
only real disputed issue between Republic and the union. See R. GORMAN, supra note 17, at
612-13.
37. For a brief summary of the diverging circuit court views on this issue, see Note, 22
VILL. L. REV. 183, 187 n.25 (1977).
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strike of this nature. 38 The Supreme Court resolved this question in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 39 holding that federal
courts were not empowered to issue an injunction against a sympathy strike,
pending arbitration as to whether such a strike was forbidden by the nostrike provision in the collective bargaining agreement. 40 Addressing the
situation where the collective bargaining agreement contained an arbitration
clause but lacked an express no-strike provision, the Buffalo Forge Court
ruled flatly that a mandatory arbitration clause did not imply an obligation
on the part of a union not to engage in sympathy strikes. 41 In United States
Steel Corp. v. UMWA (U.S. Steel II),42 the Third Circuit applied the Buffalo Forge reasoning to a damage suit brought by an employer, 4 3 and held
that where the collective bargaining agreement did not contain an express
no-strike provision, a union could not be held liable for a sympathy strike by
44
its members.
38. A Boys Markets injunction, if issued in a sympathy strike situation, would in effect
resolve the only disputed substantive issue, i.e., the propriety of the work stoppage. R. GonMAN, supra note 17, at 613. For a discussion of Boys Markets injunctions, see note 18 supra.
39. 428 U.S. 397 (1976), noted in 22 VILL. L. REV. 183 (1977). In Buffalo Forge, union
members walked off the job in support of a sister union then negotiating for the first time with
the same employer, despite an express contractual obligation not to strike. 428 U.S. at 399-401.
40. 428 U.S. at 412. The court reasoned that a Boys Markets injunction was improper because the sympathy strike did not evade the union's contractual obligation to arbitrate nor deprive the employer of his bargain, since neither the strike's "causes nor the issue underlying it
was subject to the settlement procedures" in the contract. Id. at 407-08.
This case has been much criticized. See generally Gould, On Labor Injunctions Pending
Arbitration: Recasting Buffalo Forge, 30 STAN. L. REV. 533 (1978); Lowden & Flaherty, Sympathy Strikes, Arbitration Policy and the Enforceability of No-Strike Agreements-An Analysis
of Buffalo Forge, 45 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 633 (1977).
41. 428 U.S. at 408. The Court formulated this rule rather awkwardly. The Court stated:
[H]ad the contract not contained a no-strike clause or had the clause expressly excluded
sympathy strikes, there would have been no possible basis for implying from the existence
of an arbitration clause a promise not to strike that could have been violated by the
sympathy strikers in this case ....
Id., citing Gateway Coal Co. v. UMWA, 414 U.S. 368, 382 (1974). In a footnote, the Court
attempted to clarify this cryptic remark, stating: "To the extent that the Court of Appeals ...
and other courts .. .have assumed that a mandatory arbitration clause implies a commitment
not to engage in sympathy strikes, they are wrong." 428 U.S. at 408 n.10 (citations omitted).
By combining these two statements a workable rule emerges: that a compulsory arbitration
clause alone does not imply an obligation on the part of a union not to engage in sympathy
strikes. The reasoning behind the.Court's analysis appears to be that because an implied
no-strike obligation "arises" out of the mandatory arbitration clause in the contract, Local 174,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1962), the no-strike obligation
should only be applicable to. disputes where the arbitration clause itself would be applicable.
Where a dispute is not covered by the arbitration clause, such as the underlying dispute in
Buffalo Forge, it follows that the implied no-strike obligation should not apply, thus making the
strike legal. See generally 428 U.S. at 405-09.
An express no-strike clause, on the other hand, might possibly be construed as prohibiting
a sympathy strike. This is usually a matter for the arbitrator to decide. Id. at 407-08.
42. 548 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1976). The facts in U.S. Steel II were quite similar to those in
Republic Steel; however, the legal theory advancbd by the employer was different. See notes 49
& 67 and accompanying text infra.
43. 548 F.2d at 72-73. Buffalo Forge involved a suit for injunction only. 428 U.S. at 399.
44. 548 F.2d at 72-73. The majority in U.S. Steel II rejected the employer's position that
the union breached a duty to arbitrate the question of whether union members had the right to
honor the stranger picket line, stating:
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The issue presented in Republic Steel involved both of the above lines
of case law, and thus placed the Third Circuit in the difficult position of
deciding which course to follow. Under Eazor Express and U.S. Steel I, it
appeared that the UMWA might well be liable in money damages for failing
to take reasonable means to halt the spread of the Buckeye strike, 45 if that
were proven to be the case.4 6 Yet, paradoxically, Buffalo Forge and U.S.
Steel II seemed to preclude Republic from obtaining any damages47 whatsoever since its employees had engaged in a legal sympathy strike.
The Republic Steel court began its opinion by recognizing this dilemma, 48 noting that the question reserved in U.S. Steel II4 was squarely
before it. 50 The court then summarized the basic tenets of the national
labor policy, 51 including the "shift in emphasis from the protection of a nascent labor movement to the encouragement of collective bargaining and the
development of administrative techniques for the peaceful resolution of industrial disputes." 52
Thereupon the court engaged in a lengthy discussion of the coal mining
industry in America, tracing the miner's development from his early "semifeudal existence"' 53 to current membership in "the most powerful labor
Where an obligation not to honor a stranger picket line could arise only from the duty to
arbitrate, it is unnecessary to arbitrate the issue that Buffalo Forge settles in the union's
favor: whether a mandatory arbitration clause implies a commitment not to engage in
sympathy strikes.
Id. at 73 n.13.
Judge Garth, concurring in U.S. Steel II, expressed his view more strongly, stating:
Buffalo Forge established as a matter of law that a sympathy strike does not violate a
labor contract which [contains provisions for mandatory arbitration of grievances but does
not contain an express no-strike clause of any sort]. Of course, it goes without saying that
a sympathy strike could not be enjoined under this type of contract. In addition, the
legality of such a strike would not even be subject to arbitration, since Buffalo Forge
established that such strikes are legal.
Id. at 75 (Garth, J., concurring).
Practically speaking, there appears to be little substantial difference between the "it is not
necessary to arbitrate" language of the majority, and Judge Garth's "such strikes are not even
subject to arbitration" view. Judge Garth's conclusion, however, that "since as a matter of law
sympathy strikes cannot violate contracts in this category, damages could not be recovered," id.,
appears too broad to be squared with the holding in Republic Steel.
45. The reader should note that the two strike situations in Republic Steel, being virtually
identical, will be referred to in the singular, for convenience.
46. For a discussion of Eazor Express and U.S. Steel I, see notes 30-35 and accompanying
text supra.
47. For a discussion of Buffalo Forge and U.S. Steel II, see notes 36-44 and accompanying
text supra.
48. 570 F.2d at 569-70.
49. In U.S. Steel II, employees at U.S. Steel's Robena Mine complex refused to cross picket
lines establishedCby striking miners from a West Virginia coal mine. 548 F.2d at 69. At the
district court level, the employer argued that the International and the district union were
liable for inaction in terminating the Robena sympathy strike. Id. at 70. At the appellate level,
the employer adopted the Eazor Express rationale instead, attempting to argue that the International was liable for not taking all reasonable steps to halt the spread of the allegedly illegal
West Virginia strike. Id. at 74. Since the case had not been tried at the district court level on
that latter theory, however, the U.6. Steel II court expressly declined to consider it. Id.
50. 570 F.2d at 470.
51. Id. at 470-71.
52. Id. at 470.
53. Id.
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union in the land," 54 and noting that this development paralleled the development of the national labor policy. 55 According to the court, this policy
has been frustrated in recent years by frequent outbreaks of violence, often
56
caused by the appearance of stranger or roving wildcat pickets.
57
After setting this historical stage, the court focused on the Agreement
in Republic Steel, and concluded that it was appropriate to imply a no-strike
obligation binding the UMWA as the quid pro quo for the agreement by
Republic to arbitrate grievances. 58 After another historical digression tracing the judicial recognition of the quid pro quo nature of collective bargaining agreements, 59 the court addressed the problem at bar.
The Third Circuit first found it necessary to delineate the limits of Buffalo
Forge. According to the court, Buffalo Forge did not outrightly preclude all
relief for an employer in a sympathy strike situation ;60 more importantly,
Buffalo Forge was limited only to those cases where the dispute causing the underlying strike 6 was not subject to the grievance settlement procedures of the agreement.6 2 The "crucial factor" 63 in Buffalo Forge, according to the court, was the nonarbitrability of the underlying issue. 64
Having determined this "crucial factor," the court easily distinguished
Republic Steel from both Buffalo Forge and U.S. Steel 11.65 First, the underlying disputes in the latter two cases were deemed nonarbitrable,

66

54. Id. at 473, quoting B. HUME, DEATH AND THE MINEs 20 (1971).
55. 570 F.2d at 472-73.
56. Id. at 473-74. The court stated: "Thus, while we are quick to note that the record in the
present case does not disclose that violence was forthcoming from stranger pickets, we just as
quickly appreciate the deadly potential for violence that currently exists in remote rural and
mountain coal fields." Id. at 474.
57. The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1974. See notes 3 & 4 and accompanying text supra.
58. 570 F.2d at 475. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
59. 570 F.2d at 475-76.
60. Id. at 476-77. According to the Republic Steel court, the rule in Buffalo Forge implied a
corollary that if the issues of the underlying strike were found to be arbitrable and were found
by an arbitrator to violate the union's no-strike obligation, then a federal court was empowered
to enjoin the strike. Id.
61. The Republic Steel court stated:
The strike which precipitates the sympathy action is properly referred to as the "underlying" strike. Although the terms "primary" and "secondary" strike have sometimes appeared in reference to the underlying and sympathy strikes, respectively, it is thought
that the former terms are more properly used as terms of art in labor boycott situations.
Id. at 470 n.3. In Republic Steel, the Buckeye strike was an underlying strike. See id. at 477-78.
62. Id. at 476-77.
63. Id. at 477.
0
64. Id.
65. Id. at 476-77.
66. Id. The underlying dispute in Buffalo Forge was certainly not arbitrable since the
employees in the underlying strike had no contract with the employer Buffalo Forge Co. and
thus there was no contract over which an arbitrable dispute could occur. Id. at 476. See note 39
supra. Furthermore, both parties in Buffalo Forge stipulated that the underlying strike was
"bonafide, primary, and legal." 570 F.2d at 476.
The Republic Steel court also stated that the underlying dispute in U.S. Steel II was nonarbitrable. Id. at 477. In fact, this conclusion was never drawn by the U.S. Steel II court because
the evidence regarding the underlying dispute in that case was not sufficient. 548 F.2d at 74. It
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whereas it was alleged that the underlying dispute in Republic Steel was
arbitrable. 67 Second, neither Buffalo Forge nor U.S. Steel II was tried on
Republic's theory that the sympathy action resulted from an illegal underlying strike whose issues were subject to compulsory settlement procedures of
the agreement. 68 The court thus concluded that it could not "ignore the
potential presence of a no-strike obligation,"69 and allowed Republic's
70
claim.
In allowing the claim, the Third Circuit stated that Republic must affirmatively support its theory of recovery 71 by proving: 1) that the underlying
dispute was in fact subject to the grievance and arbitration clause of the
agreement; 72 and 2) that the UMWA knew or should have known of the
action of the stranger pickets, but nevertheless failed to exhaust all reason73
able means to bring that unlawful action to an end.
Finally, the court declined to impose liability on the local, subdistrict,
and district unions. 74 The court posited three reasons for imposing liability
for money damages on the UMWA alone. 75 First, in the context of a combined wildcat awcl sympathy strike, the UMWA was in the best position to
communicate with both sets of strikers. 76 Second, the UMWA was best
would have been more accurate to have noted that the employer in U.S. Steel II never proved
the arbitrability of the underlying dispute, while on remand the employer in Republic Steel
must do so. See 570 F.2d at 478.
67. 570 F.2d at 477. The Republic Steel record, much like that in U.S. Steel I, was silent
on the question of the arbitrability of the underlying dispute. See note 7 supra. The court
allowed Republic's allegations that the dispute was arbitrable, without requiring proof, because
Republic Steel was an appeal from summary proceedings only, unlike U.S. Steel II, which involved an appeal from a jury verdict. See 570 F.2d at 477-78; 548 F.2d at 69. On remand,
Republic would have to prove that the dispute between the stranger pickets and Buckeye was
arbitrable. See text accompanying note 72 infra.
68. 570 F.2d at 477. See also note 49 supra.
69. 570 F.2d at 477.
70. Id.
71. Id. The court expressly declined "to plot the extreme boundaries of proof' since there
was a need for "more testimony and evidence than that adduced in the summary proceedings
below." Id. at 478. Instead the court presented the two proof requirements as the minimum
requirements. Id. For a summary of this test, see notes 72 & 73 and accompanying text infra.
72. 570 F.2d at 478. The court stated that "Republic should at least be required to prove
that the stranger picketing was conduct that would be enjoinable under the Boys Markets rule."
Id.
73. Id. This item of proof was dictated by the decision in Eazor Express. See notes 30-32
and accompanying text supra.
74. 570 F.2d at 478-79. The court first noted that the individual officers and members of
local unions could not be held liable for damages. Id. at 478, citing Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref.
Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962). This disposed of any possible claims against the union officers and
individual pickets in Republic Steel. 570 F.2d at 478.
According to the court, upon proper allegations and proof that the districts, subdistricts,
and locals "had discrete obligations under the collective bargaining agreement, custom, and/or
the provisions of the constitutions and by-laws of the several unions," they could be held liable
under the Republic Steel rule. Id. Otherwise, the court urged adherence to "Buffalo Forge's
pointed reminder that a mandatory arbitration clause does not imply a duty not to engage in
sympathy strikes. . . . This, in the end, is all the district, subdistrict, and locals are alleged to
have done." Id. (emphasis by the court) (citations omitted), See note 10 supra.
75. 570 F.2d at 478.
76. Id. The court stated:
An implied obligation to take reasonable steps to prevent the spread of unlawful strikes
can be imposed only to the extent that it can be exercised, and in the sympathy strike
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equipped to discipline and control recalcitrant members. 77 Third, the
industry-wide agreement mandated industry-wide responsibility for unlawful conduct of union members. 78 The court justified its imposition of liability on the UMWA by declaring that "it simply must bear certain obligations
if it is to continue to be entitled to the rights and benefits accorded by our
79
national policy."
The Republic Steel decision extends of the Eazor Express holding to an
implied no-strike obligation.8" The reasoning behind such an extension was
previously articulated in U.S. Steel 1.81 In that case, Judge Gibbons rejected the UMWA's contention that there was no basis for implying an "all
reasonable means" obligation from a no-strike covenant itself implied in
law. 82 He stated that such an argument necessarily rested on the faulty
premise that an implied no-strike obligation "somehow enjoys a less signifi83
cant legal status than an express covenant."
It is submitted that Judge Gibbons' reasoning, and its implied approval
in Republic Steel, is sound. The Republic Steel decision provides a strong
incentive for an International Union (International) to insurf that arbitrable

context, the crucial communication link which exists between the international union and
both sets of strikers may well be nonexistent between the geographically limited branches
of that union and the roving pickets.
Id. (emphasis by the court).
77. Id. at 478-79. The court did not specify the steps a union should take to control wildcat
strikers, but did note that the Taft-Hartley Act allows unions to adopt and enforce reasonable
rules for member conduct, and that expulsion from the union as a discipline measure was upheld by the Third Circuit in Lewis v. American Fed'n of State, County and Municipal
Employees, 407 F.2d 1185 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 866 (1969). 570 F.2d at 479.
78. 570 F.2d at 479. The court pointed out that Republic, Buckeye, and the International
were all parties to the same agreement, and that it was therefore
not unreasonable for a company in Republic's position to expect that the International
would enforce its agreement with Buckeye just as it would with Republic. Indeed, the
essence of our analysis of the quid pro quo nature of the labor contract would indicate
that where there is an industry-wide contract, there is an industry-wide commitment to
the peaceful settlement of grievances.
Id. (emphasis by the court).
79. id.
80. Noting the need for more testimony and evidence than was adduced in the summary
proceedings below, the Republic Steel court did not elucidate this extention of Eazor Express.
See id. at 477-78. Rather, the court suggested that Republic, in proving its claim, might find
"general support" in Eazor Express. Id. at 477. The practical consequence of the court's opinion, however, is an extention of the Eazor Express holding to a no-strike obligation itself implied in law.
81. 534 F.2d at 1072-74. U.S. Steel I did not decide whether the Eazor Express holding
should be applied to an implied no-strike obligation in the context of an employer's suit for
damages, because U.S. Steel I involved a suit for injunctive relief only. Id. at 1067. In that case,
Judge Gibbons, writing for the court, stated that "we have no occasion, in the present posture
of the case, to consider the extent, if any, to which members' actions may make the UMW,
District 5, or the Local liable for damages." Id. at 1074.
Furthermore, Judge Gibbons was the only one of the U.S. Steel I panel who expressed the
opinion that Eazor Express should be extended to an implied no-strike obligation. Id. at 107374. In separate opinions, neither Judge Rosenn nor Chief Judge Seitz addressed the issue. Id.
at 1079-84.
82. Id. at 1073.
83. Id.
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grievances are settled by agreed settlement procedures, reducing the possibility of an extended unauthorized strike. This result advances the national
labor policy favoring arbitration and the peaceful settlement of labor ,disputes. 84 Since these policy considerations were the impetus behind the
Eazor Express decision 85 and the judicial recognition of the implied nostrike obligation in the first instance,8 6 Republic Steel is logically consistent
with both.
It is further submitted that any impact of Republic Steel lies in its extention of Eazor Express to an implied no-strike obligation. The Republic
Steel court's refinement of the Buffalo Forge rule 87 with respect to a sympathy strike is limited to the relatively rare factual situation arising in Republic Steel. 88 The impo"sition of an "all reasonable means" duty where an implied no-strike obligation exists broadens Republic Steel's impact, however,
since this duty may arise in any case where a wildcat strike occurs over an
arbitrable dispute. 89

84. Eazor Express and Republic Steel, when read in conjunction, seem to balance employer
and union interests, and thus further the national labor objective of industrial peace. The decisions provide an employer with a damage remedy, which is arguably more effective in a mass
wildcat strike situation than the traditional employer alternatives of employee discharge and
Boys Markets injunction. See generally Fishman & Brown, supra note 22, at 1029-41. See also
Note, supra note 31, at 603-04. But see Whitman, Wildcat Strikes: The Unions Narrowing Path
to Rectitude?, 50 IND. L.J. 472 (1975).
From the union's viewpoint, on the other hand, union liability is not absolute since a
reasonable grace period is generally allowed in which an International may take action to stop a
wildcat strike, during which time the International need only take steps which are reasonable
under the circumstances. See generally Fishman & Brown, supra note 22, at 1033-41.
85. In Eazor Express, the court focused primarily on the language of the supplemental
agreements involved. See note 31 supra. The court, however, also stated its intent to fulfill the
Supreme Court's directive to "fashion a body of federal law in accord with the Congressional
intent and with the basic goal of Congress to promote industrial peace." 520 F.2d at 963, citing
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). See note 18 supra.
Another problem arising from Republic Steel's interpretation of Eazor Express is that, in
the latter case, Judge Maris distinguished Eazor Express from United Constr. Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 847 (1955), on the ground that
the agreement in Haislip did not contain an express no-strike agreement. 520 F.2d at 960.
Judge Gibbon responded in U.S. Steel I that "it is far from clear that Judge Maris was doing
In any event ... we choose not to
anything more than distinguishing inapposite precedent ....
accord that dictum the force of law." 534 F.2d at 1073.
86. See note 19 supra.
87. See notes 60-64 and accompanying text supra.
88. 570 F.2d at 467. The appearance of roving wildcat pickets is generally known only to a
few industries. The stranger picketing of another employer-in no way involved with the underlying dispute nor in any position to remedy the situation-is rarer still, occurring almost
exclusively among coal miners, "where the sympathy strike is a deeply established tradition."
Gould, supra note 40, at 540. Thus, the impact of Republic Steel's holding regarding a sympathy strike is rather narrow.
This is not to say that this aspect of Republic Steel is without import. On the contrary, in
the coal mining industry, the decision should prove extremely significant. Furthermore, this
aspect of Republic Steel dispelled any speculation that Eazor Express'did not survive Buffalo
Forge in the event of a spreading strike.
89. This conclusion appears sound in light of the fact that the Republic Steel court made no
attempt to limit its holding, but instead used rather sweeping language in terms of national
labor policy. See generally 570 F.2d at 479-80.
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It is suggested that the Republic Steel decision establishes a presumption of an "all reasonable means" obligation wherever a broad mandatory
arbitration clause exists in an applicable collective bargaining agreement.90 It
is further submitted that this presumption arises even before a court has
implied a no-strike obligation to the particular agreement. 91 This presumption compels an International to end an unauthorized work stoppage by its
members over a dispute which the International has contractually agreed to
92
arbitrate in order to avoid damage liability.
Significantly, the International's liability under Republic Steel is restricted to those industries which are subject to industry-wide agreements,
stich as the coal mining, 93 trucking, 94 and steel industries, 95 since the International's liability in Republic Steel is based on an industry-wide commitment to arbitrate disputes. 96 Where no such broad commitment exists, the
International arguably cannot be held liable. While Republic Steel specifically left open the possibility of local and district union liability in an ap-

90. In United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960), the Supreme Court established a presumption of arbitrability to be applied to labor
disputes if the applicable contractual language was unclear. Id. at 582-83. In Local 174, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), which held that the presence of a
compulsory arbitration provision gave rise to an implied no-strike obligation, the Court established what amounted to a presumption of a no-strike obligation coterminous with the applicable
mandatory arbitration provision. Id. at 105-06. See note 19 supra. It is suggested that Republic
Steel extends Lucas Flour by creating the presumption of an "all reasonable means" obligation
on the part of a union to end unauthorized strikes over disputes covered by the arbitration
clause.
91. During the critical first moments of an unauthorized walkout, neither a union nor the
employer knows which party will ultimately bear liability for the strike. See Note, 20 VILL. L.
REV. 679, 687 (1975). However, if the collective bargaining agreement contains a mandatory
arbitration clause, which is extremely likely, and if the unauthorized strike is over an arbitrable
dispute, Republic Steel would seem to strongly indicate that liability will rest on the union. An
International facing this unpleasant reality will be very likely to effect some immediate remedial
action.
92. Some uncertainty exists as to what action an International must take in order to satisfy
the Republic Steel "all reasonable means" obligation. The Eazor Express court suggested fines,
suspensions, and even trusteeship. 520 F.2d at 924. See note 31 supra. The Republic Steel
court noted that the "ultimate sanction" of expulsion from the union might be warranted in
some cases. 570 F.2d at 479.
A union might find some guidance, albeit limited, in Penn Packing Co. v. Meat Cutters
Local 195, 497 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1974). In that case, a union terminated a wildcat strike by
agreeing to pay the salaries of two union stewards, over whose discharge the strike had occurred, until an arbitrator decided on the propriety of the discharges. Id. at 890. The court held
that, by so doing, the union had satisfied the "all reasonable means" obligation implied from its
contract, and was relieved from any liability. Id. at 891. This type of innovative union response
should arguably be encouraged in the wake of Republic Steel.
For a more complete discussion of unauthorized strikes and the "all reasonable means"
standard, see generally, Fishman & Brown, supra note 22; Gould, supra note 22; Whitman,
supra note 84; Note, supra note 31; Note, supra note 91; Note, supra note 30.
93. See United States Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 534 F.2d 1063 (3d Cir. 1976).
94. See Eazor Express, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975).
95. See F. PETERSON, AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS 131 (2d rev. ed. 1963).
96. 570 F.2d at 479. See note 78 and accompanying text supra.
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propriate case, 97 such a remedy might prove to be fruitless in those not
uncommon instances where the local and district unions do not possess appreciable financial assets.
There also exists the possibility that an International will seek to avoid
Republic Steel liability under future collective bargaining agreements by
either not signing the agreement itself 98 or by contractually eliminating this
liability. 99 The likelihood of either seems doubtful, however. Generally
speaking, a union bargains on an industry-wide scale to achieve higher
standards than could be obtained through piecemeal bargaining with individual employers.' 00 An astute employers' association is therefore unlikely
to permit an International to so bargain on an industry-wide basis while
avoiding the industry-wide obligation now imposed under Republic Steel.
The Republic Steel case clearly posits a collective bargaining issue, and
thus the final impact of Republic Steel may well be determined at the bargaining table. This itself may prove to be a favorable consequence of the
decision, as the issue of union liability for unauthorized strikes should be
more fully discussed by both sides during contract negotiations. Hopefully,
this will result in collective bargaining agreements which anticipate a situation such as that involved in Republic Steel, and thus clearly express the
actual intent of the parties involved.
Richard L. McMonigle, Jr.

97. 570 F.2d at 478. See note 74 supra.
98. Liability of the International in Republic Steel was based, inter alia, on the fact that the
International was a signatory of the Agreement. 570 F.2d at 479. The question arises whether
an International can be liable under Republic Steel if it is not a signatory.
In Eazor Express, the court did not allow the UMWA to escape liability for unauthorized
strikes where a national administrative committee, as opposed to the International itself, had
signed the agreement. 520 F.2d at 958-59. The court found that the committee was the functional equivalent of the International. Id. This would not seem to preclude an International
from negotiating a contract to be signed by the local unions only. In theory, therefore, it would
appear that an International would be able to avoid Republic Steel liability in this manner.
99. The possibility of a union expressly reserving the right to strike over arbitrable disputes
was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Gateway Coal Co. v. UMWA, 414 U.S. 368, 382
(1974). See note 19 supra. In view of the contractual origins of the Republic Steel "all reasonable
means" duty, the Gateway argument would seem to apply, and thus an International may legally eliminate the contractual obligation. See Note, supra note 30, at 671 (similar reasoning
applied to Eazor Express).
100. F. PETERSON, supra note 95, at 130.
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LABOR LAW-SECTION 8(a)(5) OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACTTHERE IS A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION THAT EMPLOYERS MUST BARGAIN OVER DECISION TO PARTIALLY TERMINATE BUSINESS OPERATIONS.

Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB (1978)
On July 19, 1976, the union employees at a Philadelphia plant of
Brockway Motor Trucks (Brockway) were notified that management had unilaterally decided, on the basis of economic considerations, to cease operations at that plant.' At that time these employees were on strike. 2 Thereupon the union filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board
(Board) alleging that Brockway had violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the
National Labor Relations Act (Act)3 in that Brockway's management had
failed to bargain with the union over the decision to close the plant. 4 Holding that the decision to discontinue a part of a business operation constitutes
a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, the Board found that Brockway
had violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the Act. 5
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 6
declined to adopt the Board's position, 7 holding that under section 8(a)(5) of
the Act a decision to partially terminate business operations is presumed to
be a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, but that this presumption
can be rebutted under certain factual circumstances. 8 Brockway Motor
Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978).

1. Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB., 582 F.2d 720, 723 (3d Cir. 1978). The employees
were represented by Local 724 of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, AFL-CIO (union). Id. The union chose to challenge Brockway's action by bringing a
charge before the National Labor Relations Board. Id.
2. id.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976). Section 158 of the National Labor Relations Act, which in
part sets forth actions which constitute an employer's unfair labor practices and circumstances
under which the duty to bargain collectively arises, states in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title ....
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees....
(d) For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment. ...
id. §§ 158(a)(1), (a)(5), (d) (emphasis added). The quoted statutory language is referred to as
§ 8(a)(1), § 8(a)(5), and § 8(d) of the Act.
4. 582 F.2d at 723.
5. 230 N.L.R.B. 1002, 1003, 95 L.R.R.M. 1462, 1462-63 (1977). The Board reasoned that
management should bargain with the union regarding the decision to terminate operations so
that the union would have a chancd "to influence the final decisions." Id.
6. The case was heard by Judges Adams, Van Dusen, and Rosenn. Judge Adams wrote the
majority opinion, and Judge Rosenn dissented.
7. Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 734 (3d Cir. 1978).
8. Id. at 735.

(382)
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The situation extant in Brockway is known as a "partial termination." 9
The distinction between a partial termination and a complete termination'o
is crucial since the United States Supreme Court held in Textile Workers v.
DarlingtonManufacturing Company 11 that an employer does not violate the
Act if he does not bargain with his employees' union over the decision to
completely terminate operations. 12 The Darlington decision, however, was
based on a violation of section 8(a)(3) of the Act, 13 and thus did' not resolve
9. See Comment, "Partial Terminations"-A Choice Between Bargaining Equality and
Economic Efficiency, 14 U.C.L.A.*L. REv. 1089, 1092 n.19 (1967). A termination is partial
when only one segment of the business unit, rather than the entire business entity, ceases
operations. Id. One commentator has stated: "The term 'partial termination' as used by the
NLRB and the courts refers to a permanent contraction in the scope of the employer's operations." Id. The term "partial termination" thus encompasses the situations where an employer
closes one of several plants, see NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 195 (3d
Cir. 1965), or where an employer permanently closes a portion of a single operation, see NLRB
v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 361 F.2d 512, 513-14 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 385 U.S. 935 (1966);
NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108, 113 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011
(1966).
10. The United States Supreme Court defined a complete termination as an entire closing of
a business and an end to the employer-employee relationship. Textile Workers v. Darlington
Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 274 (1965).
11. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
12. Id. at 273-74. In holding that an employer does not commit an unfair labor practice
when he closes his entire business, the Supreme Court stated: "A proposition that a single
businessman cannot choose to go out of business if he wants to would represent such a startling
innovation that it should not be entertained without the clearest manifestation of legislative
intent or unequivocal judicial precedent so construing the Labor Relations Act." Id. at 270. The
Court concluded that there was not the slightest indication "that Congress envisaged such a
result" under the National Labor Relations Act. Id. As for judicial precedent, however, it noted
that there was no case "directly dispositive of Darlington's claim that it had an absolute right to
close its mill, irrespective of motive." Id.
13. Id. at 275. The Darlington Manufacturing Company was liquidated immediately after
the company's employees chose to be represented by the Textile Workers Union of America.
Id. at 265-66. After the liquidation, the union filed a complaint with the NLRB alleging that the
company had violated § 8(a)(3) of the Act in that the closing was discriminatorily motivated. Id.
at 266-67. Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organizaiton." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). The union also charged the company with a violation
of § 8(a)(5) for Darlington's alleged refusal to bargain with the union after its election. 380 U.S.
at 266-67.
Since the Darlington Manufacturing Company could be viewed as both a separate legal
entity and as an integral part of the Deering Milliken & Co. textile empire, the Supreme Court
undertook a two-pronged analysis to determine whether the closing violated § 8(a)(3). Id. at
267-68. Under one prong, the Supreme Court analyzed the situation as if it were a complete
termination. Id. at 269-74. See note 12 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the
complete termination analysis. Since the Supreme Court implicitly accepted the NLRB's finding
that the closing of Darlington was partial, however, its analysis of the situation as a complete
termination can possibly be viewed as dictum. 380 U.S. at 276-77. But see id. at 273-74 (Court
calls this ruling a "holding").
Under the second analytical prong, the Supreme Court analyzed the situation as a partial
closing. Id. at 274-77. In this regard the Supreme Court stated:
If the persons exercising control over a plant that is being closed for antiunion reasons (1)
have an interest in another business, whether or not affiliated with or engaged in the
same line of commercial activity as the closed plant, of sufficient substantiality to give
promise of their reaping a benefit from the discouragement of unionization in that business; (2) act to close their plant with the purpose of producing such a result; and (3)
occupy a relationship to the other business which makes it realistically foreseeable that its
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terminate creates a duty to
the question of whether the decision to partially
14
bargain under section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
The Board and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
have held that under section 8(a)(5) of the Act employers are obligated to
bargain with their employees over the decision to partially terminate business operations since this decision results in the termination of employment. 15 The Board's most elaborate assertion of this position can be found
employees will fear that such business will also be closed down if they persist in organization activites, we think that an unfair labor practice has been made out.
Id. at 275-76. The Darlington Court then remanded the case for further factual findings as to
whether the Darlington Manufacturing Company was liquidated with the "purpose" and "effect"
of chilling unionism. Id. at 277.
As Darlington involved an alleged violation of § 8(a)(3) of the Act, the Board has deemed it
inapplicable to cases involving alleged violations of § 8(a)(5) of the Act in regard to partial
closings. See Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 564-65, 63 L.R.R.M. 1264, 1266-67
(1966). Several circuit courts, however, have cited Darlington as authority for deciding in
§ 8(a)(5) cases that an employer does not have a duty to bargain over partial closings. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Thompson Trans. Co., 406 F.2d 698, 702-03 (10th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Adams Dairy,
Inc., 350 F.2d 108, 111-12 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966). At least one
commentator has suggested that the broadness of the language in Darlington makes the decision
relevant, though not controlling, in cases involving alleged violations of § 8(a)(5) of the Act.
Rabin, Fibreboard and the Termination of Bargaining Unit Work: The Search for Standards in
Defining the Scope of the Duty to Bargain, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 803, 816-18 (1971). For a
discussion of the conflict among the courts and the Board over this issue, see notes 15-38 and
accompanying text infra.
14. The courts are clearly divided on this issue. See notes 15-38 and accompanying text
infra.
The conflict among the circuits and between the majority of the circuits and the NLRB
stems from differing philosophies as to which decisions controlling the character and the scope
of the enterprise should be exclusively within management's prerogative. On the one hand, the
Eighth Circuit has indicated that those decisions involving basic operational changes need not be
bargained, even if such decisions result in the discharge of employees. NLRB v. Adams Dairy,
Inc., 350 F.2d 108, 111 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966). On the other hand,
the Board has indicated that those decisions which may result in the termination of employment
should always be bargained since employees have invested years of service and skill to the
benefit of the firm. Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 566-67, 63 L.R.R.M. 1264, 1267-68
(1966).
For general discussions as to this conflict, see Faulk, Duty to Bargain on a Decision to
Terminate or Relocate Operations, 25 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 96 (1968); Schwarz, Plant Relocation or PartialTermination-The Duty to Decision-Bargain, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 81 (1971).
The commentators are equally divided on this point. Compare Comment, supra note 9,
with Rabin, supra note 13. One commentator concluded that since the decision to partially
terminate is really a decision to reallocate fixed capital, and because the functioning of our
economy depends on the efficient allocation of capital resources, the decision to partially terminate must be immune from collective bargaining because collective bargaining often impedes
rational allocation decisions. Comment, supra note 9, at 1107-09. Rabin, on the other hand,
concludes that under the Supreme Court guidelines established in Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp. v. NLRB, 372 U.S. 203 (1964), the employer's decision to partially close is subject to the
duty to bargain. Rabin, supra note 13, at 826. For a discussion of Fibreboard,see notes 18-20
and accompanying text infra.
15. NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 361 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 935
(1966); Metro Transp. Servs. Co., 218 N.L.R.B. 534, 89 L.R.R.M. 1639 (1975); McGregor
Printing Corp., 163 N.L.R.B. 938, 64 L.R.R.M. 1448 (1967); Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B.
561, 63 L.R.R.M. 1264 (1966). For a discussion of Winn-Dixie, see notes 21-23 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of Ozark Trailers, see notes 16-18 and accompanying text infra.
One commentator has suggested that the rule actually employed by the NLRB is that any
managerial decision which could result in the termination of employment must be bargained.
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in Ozark Trailers, Inc. 16 in which the Board stated that the employee's
interest in remaining employed is sufficient to require management to bargain over the decision to partially terminate. 17 In Ozark Trailers, the Board

See Faulk, supra note 14, at 98. An analysis of NLRB decisions supports this proposition. See,
e.g., McLoughlin Mfg. Corp., 182 N.L.R.B. 958, 74 L.R.R.M. 1756, 1759 (1970), enforced, 463
F.2d 907, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (decision to relocate plant must be bargained); Weltronic Co.,
173 N.L.R.B. 235, 237, 69 L.R.R.M. 1282 (1968), enforced, 419 F.2d 1120, 1124 (6th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970) (decision to transfer work to new plant must be bargained); Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 564, 63 L.R.R.M. 1264, 1266 (1966) (decision
to partially terminate must be bargained); Northwestern Publishing Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 1069,
1071-72, 54 L.R.R.M. 1182, 1183 (1963), enforced, 343 F.2d 521, 526 (7th Cir. 1965) (decision
to consolidate distribution system, thereby eliminating need for unionized truck drivers, must
be bargained); Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L:R.B. 1022, 1027-28, 49 L.R.R.M. 1918,
1920-21 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846-47 (5th Cir. 1963) (decision to subcontract unit work
must be bargained).
The Board, however, does recognize that some decisions lie completely within managerial
prerogative and thus are not mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. See, e.g., General
Motors Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. 951, 952, 77 L.R.R.M. 1537, 1539 (1971), enforced, 470 F.2d 422
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (Board concluded that there was no duty to bargain over a decision to sell a
business enterprise); Summit Tooling Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 479, 480, 79 L.R.R.M. 1369, 1400
(1972) (Board held that there was not duty to bargain over the decision to liquidate a corporation even though the rest of the integrated economic group would continue in existence).
16. 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 63 L.R.R.M. 1264 (1966). In Ozark Trailers, the Board was faced
with the contention that the imposition of the obligation to bargain with respect to the decision
to partially terminate operations unduly infringes the employer's freedom to manage its own
affairs. Id. at 568-69, 63 L.R.R.M. at 1268-69. The Board initially stated that Congress, in
enacting the National Labor Relations Act, had made a basic policy determination that the
interests of the employees are of sufficient importance to justify interference with management's
freedom to run a business. Id. at 568, 63 L.R.R.M. at 1268. The Board cited the Supreme
Court decision in John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964), as support for the
proposition that the employer is not entitled to disregard the interests of his employees simply
because the decision being made is a major one. 161 N.L.R.B. at 566-67, 63 L.R.R.M. at
1267-68. The Supreme Court had stated in John Wiley that "[t]he objectives of national labor
policy, reflected in established principles of federal law, require that the rightful prerogative of
owners independently to arrange their businesses and even eliminate themselves as employers
be balanced by some protection to the employees from a sudden change in the employment
relationship." John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. at 549 (emphasis added). This statement, however, is dictum since the issue in the case was whether an arbitration clause in a
collective bargaining agreement survived a corporate merger. Id. at 544. There is thus some
question as to whether Wiley is relevant to a case involving an alleged violation of § 8(a)(5) of
the National Labor Relations Act.
For a discussion of Ozark Trailers, see Note, 36 U. CIN. L. REV. 555 (1967); Note, 20
VAND. L. REV. 932 (1967).
17. 161 N.L.R.B. at 564, 63 L.R.R.M. at 1266. In Ozark Trailers, an entire company went
out of business, and under Darlington the decision to completely terminate did not have to be
negotiated. Id. at 564-65, 63 L.R.R.M. at 1266-67. Ozark Trailers, Inc., however, was part of a
larger group of affiliated corporations which operated as a single entity. Id. at 561, 63 L.R.R.M.
at 1265. The Board viewed Ozark Trailers, Inc. as part of a single entity, and hence concluded
that the cessation was a partial, and not a complete, termination. Id. at 564-65, 63 L.R.R.M. at
1266-67. But see Milo Express, Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. 313, 314, 86 L.R.R.M. 1726, 1727-28 (1974)
(the Board found that the closing of one of two affiliated companies constituted a complete
termination as the two companies were operated independently of each other).
The United States Supreme Court has defined the criteria for determining when to view
separate business entities as part of a single integrated enterprise. Radio & Television Technicians, Local 1264 v. Broadcast Serv. & Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255 (1965). The Mobile Court
stated that the criteria, as set forth by the Board, "are interrelation of operations, common
management, centralized control of labor relations, and common ownership." Id. at 256 (citations omitted).
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relied on FibreboardPaper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 18 in which the United
States Supreme Court had held that section 8(a)(5) requires the employer to
negotiate with his employees as to the decision to substitute an independent
contractor for existing employees where the contractor will perform the same
work. 19 The Board found support for its Ozark holding in dictum from
Fibreboard which stated that the language of the Act is broad enough to
require the employer to bargain concerning all decisions which could lead to
20
the termination of employement.
The Fifth Circuit adopted a similar position in NLRB v. Winn-Dixie
Stores, Inc.,21 holding that a retail food chain could not close a cheese packaging department without first negotiating with representatives of the
unionized employees. 22 The Winn-Dixie court employed a rationale similar
18. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
19. Id. at 209. It is important to note that the Supreme Court's ruling can be deemed to be
predicated upon the fact that Fibreboard's decision to subcontract work "did not alter the Company's basic operation" and did not involve a "capital investment" decision. Id. at 213. Indeed,
Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, explicitly stated:
Nothing the Court holds today should be understood as imposing a duty to bargain collectively regarding such managerial decisions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control. Decisions concerning the commitment of investment capital and the basic scope of
the enterprise are not in themselves primarily about conditions of employment, though
the effect of the decision may be necessarily to terminate employment. If, as I think
clear, the purpose of § 8(d) is to describe a limited area subject to the duty of collective
bargaining, those management decisions which are fundamental to the basic direction of a
corporate enterprise or which impinge only indirectly upon employment security should
be excluded from that area.
Id. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring). See note 33 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of
how the Eighth Circuit has utilized this language in order to make Fibreboard inapplicable to a
partial termination.
20. 161 N.L.R.B. at 565, 63 L.R.R.M. at 1267. The NLRB quoted the following language in
Fibreboard as support for the proposition that the decision to partially terminate must be bargained:
A stipulation with respect to the contracting out of work performed by members of the
bargaining unit might approximately be called a "condition of employment." The words
even more plainly cover termination of employment which, as the facts of this case indicate, necessarily results from the contracting out of work performed by members of the
established bargaining unit.
Id. quoting Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 210 (1964). It is due to the
existence of this language in Fibreboardthat the Board now explicitly employs the rationale that
§ 8(a)(5) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain
collectively with his employees over the decision to partially terminate. 161 N.L.R.B. at 565, 63
L.R.R.M. at 1267. As the Board noted, § 8(a)(5), when read in conjunction with § 8(d), requires
the employer to bargain with employees over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment." Id., citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). As any termination of employment necessarily affects the conditions of employment, the Board is of the position that it logically follows
that any managerial decision which may result in the discharge of employees, such as the decision to partially terminate operations, must be subjected to the bargaining process. 161
N.L.R.B. at 565, 63 L.R.R.M. at 1267.
The syllogistic logic of the NLRB's position has been noted by at least one commentator.
See Schwarz supra note 14, at 87.
21. 361 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 935 (1966).
22. 361 F.2d at 516. Winn-Dixie owned and operated a multistate chain of retail food markets. Id. at 512. The chain is divided into eight divisions. Id. Of these eight divisions, only the
Jacksonville division packaged the cheese displayed in its stores; all of the other divisions purchased prepackaged cheese from independent cheese processors. Id. at 513. After a cost-benefit
analysis was done, the Jacksonville division decided to discontinue its cheese packaging opera-
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to the Board's predicating its holding on the gounds that there was no substantial difference between the decision to partially terminate and the deci23
sion to subcontract portions of an operation.
In contrast to these holdings and rationales stand the decisions of the
24
Seventh, 25 Eighth, 26
United States Courts of Appeals for the Third,

tion and to purchase prepackaged cheese from outside cheese processors instead. Id. at 513-14.
Without negotiating with its employees over the decision to terminate, the Jacksonville division
closed the cheese packaging operation. Id. at 514. Six union employees were discharged as a
result of the termination. Id. The union filed suit with the Board, alleging that the employer
violated § 8(a)(5) of the Act by failing to bargain as to its decision to terminate the cheese
packaging operation. See id. at 514-15. Both the Board and the Fifth Circuit found a violation of
§ 8(a)(5). Id. at 515-17.
23. See id. at 516-17. In holding that Winn-Dixie was under a duty to bargain regarding its
decision to partially terminate operations, the Fifth Circuit deemed its earlier decision in NLRB
v. American Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1965), to be dispositive of the issue. 361 F.2d at
517.
In American Mfg., an employer had eliminated its transportation department, discharging
the majority of its drivers and selling all of its trucks and related equipment. NLRB v. American
Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d at 77. The employer then substituted an independent trucking concern for
its defunct transportation department. Id. The Fifth Circuit held that the employer had subcontracted work and that "the decision to subcontract work is a subject for mandatory bargaining."
Id. at 80. As American Mfg., a subcontracting case, was held to be dispositive of the issues in
Winn-Dixie, it is submitted that the Fifth Circuit deems subcontracting and partial termination
to be equivalent. For a critique of this proposition, see notes 60-65 and accompanying text
infra.
One commentator has suggested that Winn-Dixie might have been decided differently if the
employer had chosen "to terminate the sale of cheese rather than terminate the cheese cutting
and packaging operation." Faulk, supra note 14 at 101. Faulk suggested that "an employer's
desire to find a cheaper method of obtaining a particular product will not be considered a basic
change in operations. But apparently termination of the sale of a particular product will be
considered a basic change." Id. Decisions which deal with "basic operational changes" have
been deemed to be within the sole discretion of management. See NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc.,
350 F.2d 108, 111 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966).
24. See NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965). In Royal
Plating, an employer who had suffered severe losses closed one of its two plants without
negotiating with the union. Id. at 195. The Third Circuit, in holding that the employer was not
under a duty to bargain over the decision to partially terminate, stated that "an employer faced
with the ecpnomic necessity of either moving or consolidating the operations of a failing business
has no duty to bargain with the union respecting its decision to shut down." Id. at 196 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Royal Plating can be construed more broadly than the quoted
language suggests, as the Third Circuit emphasized the distinctions between the facts in
Fibreboard and those in Royal Plating. Id. at 195-96. Indeed, one commentator has stated:
"While the ... [Third Circuit] noted that this was a failing company, there is no reason to
believe that its decision was limited to such a circumstance." Schwarz, supra note 14, at 88. For
a discussion of how the Third Circuit has subsequently dealt with Royal Plating, see notes 45 &
46 and accompanying text infra.
25. See Jay Foods v. NLRB, 292 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 969
(1964). In Jay Foods, a company eliminated its automobile maintenance and repair department
pursuant to the results of a cost-benefit analysis, and instead contracted that work to independent garages. 292 F.2d at 319-20. The Seventh Circuit stated:
Fundamentally, if the employer makes a change in operation because of reasonably anticipated increased costs, regardless of whether they are caused by or contributed to by
the advent of a union or by some other factor, his action does not constitute discrimination within the provisions of section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act.
Id. at 320. As Jay Foods is a pre-Fibreboarddecision, however, its continued validity is suspect
in light of the Fibreboard Court's statement that decisions to effecutate cost savings are
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Ninth,2 7 and Tenth 2 8 Circuits. 2 9 Of these circuits, the Eighth is the most
adamant in holding that the decision to partially terminate business operations is not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. 30 In NLRB v.
"peculiarly suitable for resolution within the collective bargaining framework." 379 U.S. at 21314. For a discussion of Fibreboard, see notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra.
26. See Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 1030, 1039 (8th Cir. 1976) (decision to
close subsidiary, when predicated on economic considerations, need not be bargained);
Morrison Cafeterias Consol. v. NLRB, 431 F.2d 254, 257 (8th Cir. 1970) (in light of Supreme
Court decision in Darlington, decision to close subsidiary need not be bargained); NLRB v.
Drapery Mfg. Co., 425 F.2d 1026, 1027-28 (8th Cir. 1970) (decisions to close subsidiary, when
based on economic reasons, need not be bargained); NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d
108, 113 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966) (milk producer may liquidate distribution operation without bargaining over the decision to liquidate); NLRB v. Burns Int'l
Detective Agency, 346 F.2d 897, 901 (8th Cir. 1965) (when closing due to loss of major customer, multistate detective agency may terminate operation in single metropolitan area without
negotiating with union over decision to close).
27. See NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1967). In Transmarine, the Ninth Circuit held that when a company is faced with the loss of a major customer
due to inadequate facilities, the company may terminate operations and become a minority
partner in a larger joint venture without first bargaining with the union over its decision to close
the original operation. Id. at 939. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[a] decision of
such fundamental importance to the basic direction of the corporate enterprise is not included
within the area of mandatory collective bargaining." Id. For a discussion of Transmarine, see
Note, 25 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 96 (1968).
28. See NLRB v. Thompson Transp. Co., 406 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1969). In Thompson, the
Tenth Circuit held that a trucking firm which had lost a major part of its business had no duty
to bargain over the decision to close one of its two truck terminals since the decision was
"motivated by sound economic reason." Id. at 703.
29. Other federal circuit courts have adopted positions similar to that of the Third, Eighth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, holding that certain decisions involving basic operational changes
need not be bargained. See United Auto. Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers v.
NLRB, 470 F.2d 422, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (manufacturer under no obligation to bargain as to
decision to convert retail outlet into independent franchise); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 473 F.2d 54, 556 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845
(1972) (no duty to bargain as to decision to merge with another company); NLRB v. Dixie-Ohio
Express Co., 409 F.2d 10, 11 (6th Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (decision to change truck loading and
unloading procedure need not be bargained).
The Second Circuit, however, indicated in a plant relocation case that it might hold that
any decision which could terminate employment must be bargained. See Cooper Thermometer
Co. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 684, 688 (2d Cir. 1967). In Cooper Thermometer, the Secnd Circuit
stated: "The most important interest of workers is in working; the Board may reasonably consider that an employer does not fulfill his obligations under § 8(a)(5) if he refuses even to discuss
with the employees' representatives on what basis they may continue to be employed." Id.
30. See note 25 supra.
In holding that an employer is under no duty to bargain with respect to the decision to
partially terminate operations, the Eighth Circuit has adopted two analytic modes. Under the
first of these modes the Eighth Circuit has stated that an employer is under no duty to bargain
in regard to those decisions, including the decision to partially terminate, involving a "basic
operational change" or the reallocation of "capital investment." See NLRB v. Drapery Mfg. Co.,
425 F.2d 1026, 1027-28 (8th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108, 111 (8th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966).
Under the second mode of analysis, the Eighth Circuit cited Darlington as controlling
precedent and stated that before there can be a violation of § 8(a)(5) there must be a finding of a
violation of § 8(a)(3). Morrison Cafeterias Consol. v. NLRB, 431 F.2d 254, 257 (8th Cir. 1970);
NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108, 112-13 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011
(1966). If a business were thus partially terminated for economic reasons, and not for the purpose of chilling unionism, there is no duty to bargain as to the decision to close. 350 F.2d at
112-13.
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Adams Dairy, Inc., 31 the Eighth Circuit held that a milk producer may
liquidate its distribution system and begin selling its product to independent
producers without first discussing the decision with its unionized
employees. 32 The court felt that the decision to partially terminate a business is a decision concerned with basic operational changes, and since such
decisions involve the reallocation of capital investment, they are within the
sole discretion of management. 33 The Eighth Circuit cited Darlington as
applicable precedent and concluded that since there was no showing of
union animus, the decision to partially liquidate did not have to be bar34
gained.
The Eight Circuit reaffirmed its position in Royal Typewriter Co. v.
NLRB, 35 stating that "absent union animus a company has no legal duty to
bargain with a union over its decision to partially shut-down operations because of economic considerations." 36 Similarly, in NLRB v. Royal Plating &
31. 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966).
32. Id. at 113.
33. Id. at 111. By employing such reasoning the Eighth Circuit distinguished Adams Dairy
from Fibreboard. The Eighth Circuit stated:
Contrary to the situation in Fibreboard . . . there is more involved in Adams Dairy than
just the substitution of one set of employees for another. In Adams Dairy there is a
change in basic operating procedure in that the dairy liquidated that part of its business
handling distribution of milk products. Unlike the situation in Fibreboard, there was a
change in the capital structure of Adams Dairy which resulted in a partial liquidation and
a recoup of capital investment. To require Adams to bargain about its decision to close
out the distribution end of its business would significantly abridge its freedom to manage
its own affairs.
id.
One commentator has concluded that the Eighth Circuit's distinction between a partial
termination and a subcontracting of unit work is supportable only when the subcontracting
involved a reallocation of fixed capital. Comment, supra note 9, at 1109. Under this analysis,
Fibreboard merely involved a decision to shift working capital. Id. According to the author,
fixed capital is that "capital invested in relatively fixed assets like plant and equipment." Id. at
1095. Working capital, on the other hand, denotes "cash and short-term investments which
provide funds for purchase of inventory and payment of wages." Id. Accordingly, it is the partial
termination of a business that usually involves the reallocation of fixed capital investment, i.e.,
the liquidation of plant and equipment. Id. at 1099-101. Fibreboardshould thus be inapplicable
to most cases involving partial terminations. See id. at 1101.
34. 350 F.2d at 111-13. The Eighth Circuit stated that the Supreme Court decision in
Darlington supported its holding since there had been no showing that the dairy's decision to
partially terminate operations was motivated by anti-union sentiment. Id.
An interesting comparison can be made between Adams Dairy and the holdings in NLRB
v. Johnson, 368 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1966), and NLRB v. Northwestern Publishing Co., 343 F.2d
521 (7th Cir. 1965). The comparison reveals that it is often hard to distinguish between situations in which the employer is partially terminating the business and those in which he is
merely instituting a subcontracting program. See id.; NLRB v. Johnson, 368 F.2d 549 (9th Cir.
1966).
35. 533 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976).
36. Id. at 1039 (citations omitted). Royal Typewriter Company was an unincorporated division of Litton Business Systems, Inc., which in turn was a wholly owned subsidiary of Litton
Industries, Inc. Id. at 1033 n.2; In 1969, the unionized employees of Royal Typewriter went on
strike at one of Royal's manufacturing plants. Id. at 1034. During the course of the strike the
company announced its decision to close the plant and transfer the work to another facility. Id.
Shortly thereafter a complaint was filed alleging that Royal Typewriter had committed unfair
labor practices. Id. at 1035. The Board found that the company had a duty to bargain in good
faith with respect to its decision to close the plant. Id. The Eighth Circuit declined to adopt the
Board's view on this point, however. Id. at 1039.
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Polishing Co., 37 the Third Circuit held that an employer who partially terminated his business due to economic necessity was not under a duty to
38
bargain with the union.
Against this background, the Brockway court, in a divided decision, rejected both the position of the Board and the position of the Eight Circuit. 39 The majority began its analysis by framing the issue presented as
whether the managerial decision to partially terminate business operations is
a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.40 Examining prior case law,
the majority focused on decisions which dealt with either the partial closing
of a business entity or the apparently analogous situation of the subcontract41
ing of unit work.
The majority first observed that, in the aftermath of Fibreboard,42 the
Board has assumed a pro-bargaining position with respect to the employer's
duty to bargain over decisions affecting employment.4 3 The majority
pointed out, however, that many courts are "at odds" with the Board, and
have not imposed a duty to bargain in the factual context of a partial termination. 44 Noting that a previous Third Circuit decision, NLRB v. Royal
Plating & Polishing Co., 45 has often been mistakenly placed in the latter
category, the court stated that the rule of Royal Plating is limited to the
proposition that no duty to bargain will be imposed where the decision to
partially terminate is made out of the economic necessity of minimizing a
46
firm's losses.
After concluding that prior case law provided no systematic framework
for resolving the issue at bar, 47 the Brockway court proceeded to enunciate
its own "preferred view." 48 It thereupon found a rebuttable presumption
49
that the decision to partially close is subject to the bargaining process
without specifying the factual proof that would rebut the presumption.5 0 The
37. 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965).
38. Id. at 196. For a discussion of Royal Plating see note 24 supra; text accompanying notes
45 & 46 infra.
39. See 582 F.2d at 731-34.
40. See id. at 725-26. For a discussion of §§ 8(a)(5) & (d) of the Act, see note 3 supra.
41. 582 F.2d at 726.
42. For a discussion of Fibreboard, see notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra.
43. 582 F.2d at 730-31.
44. Id. at 731. The majority cited no cases at this point in its opinion, though earlier in its
analysis the majority examined many of the cases discussed in this note. For a discussion of
these cases, see notes 10-38 and accompanying text supra.
45. 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965). For a discussion of Royal Plating, see notes 24 & 37-38 and
accompanying text supra.
46. 582 F.2d at 731-32.
47. Id. at 731.
48. Id. at 734.
49. Id. at 735. The court reasoned that the interests of both the employer and the
employees are best accommodated through the use of a rebuttable- presumption that the employer
is under a duty to bargain. Id. By creating a presumption of a duty to bargain, instead of a per
se rule that there is or is not a duty to bargain, the courts will be forced to focus on the facts of
each particular case and to decide which party has the more meritorious claim. Id.
50. Id. at 735-39. The Third Circuit intimated, however, that if the company had offered
proof that its refusal to bargain had been predicated upon economic necessity, the presumption
of a duty to bargain would have been rebutted. Id. at 738-39.
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Third Circuit concluded that on the facts of the instant case it would not
require Brockway to bargain for two reasons: 1) by the time of the decision,
Brockway had been completely terminated, and it was thus probable that an
order mandating negotiation was fruitless; 51 and 2) as the court did not know
the factual circumstances surrounding the decision to close, it would be in52
equitable to require Brockway to bargain.
In his dissent, Judge Rosenn stated that the focal point of the case sub
judice was that Brockway's
decision to close was motivated solely by
"economic considerations." 53 He determined that any decision to partially
close operations, if based on "bona-fide economic reasons," is not within the
scope of the duty to bargain. 54 Judge Rosenn included within his definition
of bona-fide economic reasons the desire to maximize profits, since this permits the greatest national economic growth through the free flow of capital
investment.55 He claimed that an employee's right to bargain as to the
decision to partially close would impair management's ability to effectively
and speedily allocate investment capital, and thereby inhibit profit maximizing efforts. 56 The dissent thus concluded that, even from a broad societal
perspective, the decision to partially close a firm should not be bargained as
57
long as the decision is not motivated by anti-union sentiment.
It is submitted that the majority opinion contains several analytical
problems. The opinion's first shortcoming is found in the analogy between
the decision to subcontract unit work and the decision to partially terminate
operations. 58 The second problem lies in the fact that the creation of a
presumption of a duty to bargain is, in effect, the creation of a per se rule. 59
The analogy between subcontracting and partial termination is inapposite as there is a basic distinction between them. 60 Subcontracting involves
the replacement of existing employees with new employees, 61 which only
alters the manner in which the working capital of the firm is being internally
51. Id. at 740. A question arises as to whether the Third Circuit's conclusion regarding the
complete termination of Brockway is correct. Brockway was a division of Mack Trucks, Inc., and
as such it is simply part of a larger corporate entity. It is thus arguable that the duty to bargain
should have been imposed on Mack Trucks, Inc.
52. Id. at 739-40.
53. Id. at 741 (Rosenn, J.,dissenting). According to Judge Rosenn, the stipulation that the
closing of the plant was solely for economic reasons made Royal Plating dispositive of the issue
as to whether Brockway was under the duty to bargain. Id. at 743 (Rosenn, J.,dissenting). For
a discussion of Royal Plating, see notes 24, 37-38 & 45-46 and accompanying text supra.
54. 582 F.2d at 744-45 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 743 n.8 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
56. See id. at 748-49 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
57. See id. at 749 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
58. For a discussion of the distinction between subcontracting and the partial termination of
operations, see notes 60-65 and accompanying text infra.
59. For a critique of the majority's rule that the decision to partially terminate is presumptively subject to the bargaining process, see notes 66-68 and accompanying text infra.
60. See notes 61-65 and accompanying text infra.
61. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215 (1964). The Supreme
Court, for example, stated that the subcontracting by the Fibreboard Corporation involved only
the replacement of existing employees with those of an independent contractor. Id. For a discussion of Fibreboard, see notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra.
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distributed. 62 The partial termination of a business, on the other hand, resuits not only in the discharge of employees but also in the cessation of the
operations terminated, and thereby effects relatively permanent contractions
in the firm's fixed capital. 63 It is submitted that the majority's failure to
recognize this distinction and its reliance on Fibreboard,64 a decision involving subcontracting, led to its creation of the presumption that the duty to
65
bargain is applicable to decisions to partially terminate business operations.
Furthermore, it is suggested that this presumption is really a per se
rule in that the duty to bargain apparently arises automatically unless the
decision to partially terminate falls within a limited "economic necessity"
exception based on the dire financial condition of the employer. 66 Yet, in
the free enterprise system, economics necessitates profit maximization,
which is hampered where capital investment is contingent on the prolonged
process of collective bargaining. 6 7 The failure to allocate capital efficiently
adversely affects society as a whole since there is a curtailment in the creation of new technologies, new industries, and new jobs. 68 The Brockway
court may have thus adopted a rule which has worse economic consequences
than those which result from the application of current law.
It is submitted, therefore, that the Third Circuit should not have limited its prior holding in NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 69 but rather
should have expanded it so as to protect managerial prerogative regarding
capital investment decisions. 70 One of the major purposes behind the National Labor Relations Act would thereby have been served 7 ' since the effi62. Comment, supra note 9, at 1095-96. Subcontracting involves the shifting of working
capital, such as cash, and not the reallocation of fixed capital, such as plant and equipment. Id.
The decision to subcontract out does not thus involve a basic operational change. Id.
63. Id. at 1096-97. As a partial termination involves a contraction of investment capital, e.g.,
the liquidation of such fixed assets as plant and equipment, the decision to partially terminate
usually involves major operational changes. Id. Decisions involving major operational changes
have been held not to be subject to the duty to bargain. See notes 24-38 and accompanying text
supra.
64. For a discussion of Fibreboard,see notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra.
65. See 582 F.2d at 734-40. It is submitted that Fibreboardshould not be deemed controlling precedent. See Comment, supra note 9, at 1099-101. The commentator reasoned that a
partial termination usually involves a decision to reallocate fixed capital investment. Id. at
1096-97. The decision to subcontract that was involved in Fibreboard was concerned only with
working capital. Id. at 1100. Due to this factual distinction, Fibreboardis inapplicable to most
cases involving partial termination. See id.
66. 582 F.2d at 738. See note 50 and accompanying text supra. See also 582 F.2d at 742
(Rosenn, J., dissenting).
67. See 582 F.2d at 748-49 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). See also Comment, supra note 9, at
1103-05.
68. See Comment, supra note 9, at 1091-95.
69. 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965). For a discussion of Royal Plating, see notes 24, 37-38 &
45-46 and accompanying text supra.
70. It is submitted that the rule promulgated by the dissent would be more appropriate.
For a discussion of this rule, see text accompanying note 57 supra.
71. The legislative purpose fulfilled is contained in the following excerpt from paragraph 4 of
§ 1 of the present National Labor Relations Act: "Experience has further demonstrated that
certain practices by some labor organizations ... have the intent or necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce . . . through concerted activities which impair the interest of the
public in the free flow of commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) (emphasis added). By protecting
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cient allocation of capital permits the maximum number of people to be
72
employed.
Douglas M. Robison
the public's interest in the free flow of commerce, national economic growth is ensured. See
Comment, supra note 9, at 1093-95.
72. Comment, supra note 9, at 1093-95.
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